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I. INTRODUCTION
Isolated food safety crises are not uncommon occurrences in
the United States. Indeed, the history of public scares indicates a
pattern of deficiencies in the safety of the American food supply. In
the early 20th century, the public learned of the squalid conditions
of meatpacking facilities through muckraking publications such as
Upton Sinclair's The jungle.' In the 1980s, a 60 Minutes report
documented research finding carcinogenic properties of a wide-
spread pesticide, traces of which were commonly found in apple-
based products. In the 1990s, widespread media reports of beef
tainted with E. coli' led to both product recalls unprecedented in
scope and massive sales losses in the beef and fast-food industries.'
* J.D. Candidate, May 2011, University of Wisconsin Law School. The author
wishes to thank Professor Stephanie Tai for her helpful comments and suggestions
in preparing this article.
1. UroN SINCLAIR, THEJUNGLE (Signet Classics ed. 1998) (1906).
2. Daminozide, commonly known as Alar, is a chemical used to enhance apples
during the 1970s and 80s. In the late 1980s, research had shown a correlation be-
tween Alar exposure and tumor development in animals. In response, consumer
groups called for the ban of Alar use on crops, which the EPA implemented. Since
then, further research has indicated that the minimum administration amount of
Alar before expressing carcinogenic properties is far higher than normal human
consumption. Today, the ordeal of the late 1980s is commonly referred to as the
"Alar scare." See Environmental Working Group, Myth of Alar Scare Persists,
ENVIRONMENTAL WORKING GROUP (Feb. 1, 1999), http://www.ewg.org/book/
export/htmV8004.
3. The E. coli 0157:H7 strain of bacteria is one of the most formidable patho-
gens responsible for severe foodborne illness. An E. coli 0157 bacterium produces
verotoxin and shiga-like toxins, damaging the host's intestinal lining and causing
severe, "grossly bloody" diarrhea. See Foodborne Pathogenic Microorganisms and Natu-
ral Toxins Handbook: Escherichia coli 0157:H7, FDA.Gov, http://www.fda.gov/Food/
FoodSafety/Foodbornellless/FoodbornelllnessFoodbornePathogensNaturalToxins/
BadBugBook/ucm07 1284.htm (last visited Sept. 17, 2010). Although infection
from E. coli 0157 is uncommon, the bacterium is most lethal to young children
(who may develop hemolytic uremic syndrome (HUS), causing kidney failure) and
the elderly (who suffer a mortality rate as high as 50% from 0157 infection). Id.
4. Two incidents marred the beef industry through the 1990s. First, in 1993,
several deaths were attributed to consumption of contaminated beef from the fast-
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In this decade, fresh produce has been the source of one of the
largest outbreaks of foodborne illness in American history.' But
perhaps the most noteworthy distinguishing factor between each of
these incidents has been the relative amount of top-down regula-
tions imposed immediately after the resulting scare. Not coinciden-
tally, federal legislation requiring agency inspection of all meat
products passed in the same year as The Jungle was published.' In
1989, the EPA banned the use of the Alar pesticide.! Federal
and/or state regulation, therefore, has become accepted as a stan-
dard part of day-to-day operations for the majority of agricultural
industries.'
On the other hand, the fresh produce industry has seemingly
rested in an isolated bubble, untouched by agency hands.! This ab-
sence of a true regulatory framework has perhaps been most pro-
nounced in the leafy produce industry - one of the largest and fast-
est growing produce sectors, including cultivation of spinach, let-
tuce, and cabbage.'o Before 2006, no mandates were imposed on
food chain Jack in the Box Jack in the Box E. coli Outbreak - Western States,
MARLERCLARK.COM., http://www.marlerclark.com/case-news/view/jack-in-the-box-
e-coli-outbreak-western-states (last visited Sept. 20, 2010). Second, in 1997, the
Hudson Foods Company recalled over 25 million pounds of ground beef (much of
which had been sold to the fast-food chain Burger King), amounting to the largest
food recall in U.S. history. See Press Release, USDA, USDA Announces Recall of
Additional Hudson Frozen Ground Beef (Aug. 15, 1997), available at
http://www.usda.gov/news/releases/1997/08/0276; See also Dana Canedy, Busi-
nesses Remove Beef and Assure Customers, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 1997,
http://www.nytimes.com/ 1997/08/22/us/businesses-remove-beef-and-assure-
customers.html.
5. See Carl Nagin, How Safe Is Your Salad?, San Francisco Chronicle, Dec. 16,
2007, http://articles.sfgate.com/2007-12-16/living/17272757_1 natural-selection-
foods-coliout break-0157-h7.
6. See Meat Inspection Act of 1906, ch. 3913, 34 Stat. 674 (1906) (discussed in
Part IIB, infra).
7. See Environmental Working Group, supra note 2.
8. See, e.g., Meat Inspection Act, supra note 6 (requiring inspection of all meat
products); Poultry Products Inspection Act of 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-172, 71 Stat. 441
(requiring inspection of all domesticated fowl intended for human consumption);
Egg Products Inspection Act, 7 C.F.R. § 57 (2010) (requiring federal inspection of
all eggs sold in interstate commerce and intended for human consumption); Haz-
ard Analysis and Critical Control Point (HACCP) Systems, 21 CFR § 120 (2010)
(requiring juice processor compliance with HACCP (discussed infra) regulations).
9. See infra notes 25-26.
10. See Food Safety: Special Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Agriculture, Rural Devel-
opment, Food and Drug Administration and Related Agencies of the S. Comm. on Appro-
priations, 110th Cong. 35 (2007) (statement of Andrew C. von Eschenbach, Com-
missioner of Food and Drug Administation, Department of Health and Human
Services) ("In the past decade, fresh produce consumption has increased, and fresh-
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growers in following baseline quality-control standards." Growers'
interest groups controlled the dictation of which agricultural prac-
tices furthered food safety. 2 Then, the E. coli outbreak in 2006,"
linked to contaminated spinach crops, received ubiquitous media
exposure. Sales of the once blossoming leaf plummeted." Restau-
rants reported large losses? Grocers and supermarkets were forced
to pull substantial stocks from their shelves. Industry actors, per-
haps realizing that another such outbreak could spell economic dis-
aster for the entire industry, yet wanting to avoid top-down govern-
mental regulation, took the lead in crafting a private, contractual
marketing plan to spur better agricultural practices." The arrange-
ment, known as the Leafy Greens Marketing Agreement, has been
both hailed as a model of regulatory cooperation between industry
and state, and sharply criticized as an inadequate safeguard for food
safety. The former position, it seems, has become dominant, as
cut produce represents a particularly fast-growing segment of the fresh produce
market."). Revenue from spinach and lettuce sales alone totaled nearly two billion
dollars in 2004. Matthew Kohnke, Reeling in a Rogue Industry: Lethal E Coli in Cali-
fornia's Leafy Green Produce & the Regulatory Response, 12 Drake J. Agric. L. 493, 495
(2007).
11. See infra notes 25-26.
12. See infra notes 27, 29.
13. The E. coli 0157:H7 strain (discussed at supra note 3) was implicated as the
culprit pathogen responsible for the illnesses and fatalities caused by the outbreak.
See Nagin, supra note 5 ("[A] rare and particularly virulent strain of Escherichia coli
0157:H7 sickened more than 200 people across North America, hospitalizing half
of them, some with severe kidney damage, and killing two elderly women and a
child.").
14. See infra note 55.
15. See, e.g., Michael Y. Park, E. Coli Outbreak Hurts Spinach Farming Industry,
Restaurants, Fox News, Sept. 22, 2006, http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,
215257,00.html ("The spinach scare has been devastating to restauranteurs like
Nancy Horn, of Reno, Nev. Her 38-seat restaurant... specializes in vegetarian op-
tions, and includes spinach on several of its sandwiches. Since the outbreak, busi-
ness is down on the restaurant side: Her average daily sales of $1,000 have declined
between $250 and $350, and her catering business has seen 'a huge drop"'); see also
Julie Schmit, Spinach Producers Take Financial Hit, USA Today, Sept. 19, 2006,
http://www.usatoday.com/money/industries/food/2006-09-19-spinach-usat-x.htm.
16. See Press Release, FDA, FDA Statement on Foodborne E. coli 0157:H7 Out-
break in Spinach (Oct. 4, 2006), available at http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/
Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/2006/ucml08757.htm..
17. See Kohnke, supra note 10, at 508 ("With [Governor Schwarzenegger's] veto
hanging in the balance, it was up to Western Growers to prove that its industry-run
program was better than a traditional, government-based food safety framework.").
18. The most vocal critics tend to be consumer advocacy organizations. See, e.g.,
Testimony of Patty Lovera, Food & Water Watch, Before USDA Leafy Greens Mar-
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federal agencies are currently considering instituting a nationwide
version of California's Agreement." Because of the apparent
trendiness of this cooperative regulatory model, discussion of the
desirability and effectiveness of such strategies is all the more im-
portant.
Focusing on the victory of the Leafy Greens Marketing Agree-
ment in California for the purposes of improving food safety, this
paper examines the responses primarily by state and regional indus-
try actors, and provides a critical assessment of the relatively hands-
off approach settled upon. The California leafy produce" industry is
an ideal subject to focus analysis for several reasons. First, leafy
produce was implicated in the 2006 outbreak, and is a sector of the
produce industry in which consumer concern is high." Second,
leafy produce is one of the fastest growing produce sectors, making
it an industry in which improvement of food safety is critical for
continued growth." Finally, the leafy produce industry is largely
keting Agreement Hearing, Sept. 22-24, 2009, available at
http://www.nationalorganiccoalition.org/Loveratestimony.pdf.
19. The federal proposal is called the "National Leafy Greens Marketing Agree-
ment" (NLGMA). See Cary Blake, Leafy Green Growers Voice NLGMA Support, West-
ern Farm Press, Nov. 16, 2009, at 10.
20. For the purposes of this paper, I shall adopt the definition of the term "leafy
produce" as stated in the LGMA:
"'Leafy Green Products' means iceberg lettuce, romaine lettuce, green leaf
lettuce, red leaf lettuce, butter lettuce, baby leaf lettuce (i.e., immature let-
tuce or leafy greens), escarole, endive, spring mix, spinach, cabbage, kale,
arugula and chard."
CAL. DEP'T OF FOOD AND AGRIC., CALIFORNIA LEAFY GREEN PRODUCTS HANDLER
MARKETING AGREEMENT (Mar. 5, 2008), available at http://www.caleafygreens.
ca.gov/members/documents/LGMAmarketingagreement03.08_000.pdf.
21. See Carlos Arnade, Linda Calvin, & Fred Kuchler, Consumers' Response to the
2006 Foodborne Illness Outbreak Linked to Spinach, Amber Waves, Mar. 2010, available
at
http://www.ers.usda.gov/AmberWaves/Marchl0/Features/OutbreakSpinach.htm
(finding that sales of bagged spinach is still some $2-4 million less than would be
predicted without the initial food safety shock in 2006, and that consumers "rapidly
responded" to the FDA's warnings); Press Release, Harris Interactive, Consumer
Concern Over Product Recalls High (June 12, 2007), available at
http-//www.harrisinteractive.com/vaul/Harris-Interactive-Poll-Research-Cisis-Food-
Recalls-2007-06.pdf (noting that nearly 85% of those polled were "familiar" with the
2006 spinach E. coli outbreak and that 86% expressed food safety concerns).
22. See California's Top 10 Commodities for 2002-03, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA,
http://www.universityofcalifornia.edu/economy/agtoplO.html (last visisted Sept.
15, 2010) (noting that lettuce (a leafy vegetable) was the most purchased produce
crop, only behind grapes).
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concentrated in California, making the interplay of state and indus-
try actors and the public easier to analyze."
Discussion of these topics will proceed in five parts. Part II of
this paper will examine the history and food safety track record of
the leafy produce industry before the watershed 2006 E. coli out-
break. Part III will detail the background of the outbreak, noting
the investigative activity and findings by federal and state agencies.
Part IV will analyze the responses proposed by state legislators and
industry actors. Specifically, this section will focus upon a compari-
son between a state-driven regulatory proposal essentially subjecting
leafy produce to top-down scrutiny similar to that found in the meat
or dairy industries, and an industry-driven proposal using consumer
demand as a motivating force to compel grower firms to implement
effective food safety mechanisms.
Part V will critically assess the proposal eventually adopted, the
Leafy Greens Marketing (LGMA), noting its strengths, peculiarities,
systemic problems, and, most importantly, its potential ineffective-
ness in improving food safety in leafy produce. This part notes that
the advantages of the LGMA are that it presents a low-cost, quick,
and seemingly cooperative method between industry and govern-
ment to improve food safety in the short term, and that it has
achieved widespread participation by individual growers and proces-
sors. However, these benefits are offset by mostly prospective defi-
ciencies in the terms of the Agreement which 1) actually make the
effort more industry-driven than cooperative, 2) vest standard-
making power disparately with larger firms, ignoring consideration
of the ability of smaller, less economically capable farms to comply
with guidelines, 3) do not bind participants to stay in the Agreement
and 4) do not provide sufficiently severe penalties for non-
compliance.
Finally, mindful of Part V's analysis, Part VI will propose solu-
tions for improving leafy produce food safety in the future. This
paper concludes that while the LGMA presents several concerns in
its overall ability to improve food safety, the Agreement can address
these deficiencies by slightly tweaking its structure and terms, while
23. See CAL. DEP'T OF FOOD AND AGRIC., CALIFORNIA AGRICULTURAL RESOURCE
DIRECTORY 2008-09 (2003), available at www.cdfa.ca.gov/statistics/files/CDFA
Secl.pdf (noting that 75% of the nation's leafy green produce is grown in Califor-
nia).
24. For further reading of the responses and rhetoric of state and industry actors
in the formation of the LGMA, see generally Kohnke, supra note 10 (providing a




still retaining its low-cost advantages. Thus, a modified LGMA may
be a viable type of regulatory scheme effective in enhancing food
safety not merely for leafy produce, but in many other agricultural
industries.
II. VOLUNTARY REGULATIONS IN LEAFY PRODUCE
A. Background of Production Directives
Historically, the leafy produce industry has been essentially a
self-regulated industry." Not one mandatory regulation (regulation
with which compliance is compulsory) had been imposed specifically
on growers." Instead, the primary "regulations" to control micro-
bial contamination of produce have come in the form of voluntary
guidance documents." These documents, usually compiled by pro-
ducer associations and interest groups, detail minimum quality con-
trol guidelines, known as Good Agricultural Practices (GAPs)." For
instance, guidance documents released in California by Western
Growers Association (WGA) and the International Fresh-Cut Pro-
duce Association (IFPA) set guidelines on the production of leafy
green crops, providing suggestions for proper irrigation and soil
25. See, e.g., Testimony of Caroline Smith DeWaal, Director of Food Safety for
the Center for Science in the Public Interest Before the House Committee on
Oversight and Government Reform, July 29, 2009, available at
http://cspinet.org/new/pdf /house-govt oversight -leafy-green-testimony_-
july_09.pdf (noting that "domestic produce [emphasizing leafy produce] is largely
unregulated"). See also Marian Burros, E. Coli Fears Inspire a Call for Oversight, N.Y.
Times, Dec. 9, 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/09/nyregion/
09produce.html?ex-1323320400&en=f6e8c8dcb68ba228&ei=5088&partner-rssnyt&
emc=rss (noting that prior to the outbreak, governmental regulation did not exist
within the leafy produce industry). But see CAL. DEP'T OF PUB. HEALTH: FOOD AND
DRUG BRANCH, FACILrIY INSPECTIONS, available at http://www.cdph.ca.gov/
pubsforms/Guidelines/Documents/fdb%20Facil%20Inspect.pdf (noting that Cali-
fornia imposes mandatory facility inspections for food processors, enforcing regula-
tions contained in Good Manufacturing Practice (GMP) documents).
26. See Kohnke, supra note 10, at 502 ("growers, processors, and shippers of
fresh produce have successfully avoided food safety regulations on both the state
and federal levels").
27. See FDA Actions Regarding Produce Safety, PRODUCE SAFETY PROJECT,
http://www.producesafetyproject.org/admin/fact-sheets/files/0006.pdf (last vis-
ited Nov. 12, 2010).
28. See id.; see also NAT'L WATERMELON Ass'N, VOLUNTARY FOOD SAFETY
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amendment practices, harvesting techniques, and handling proce-
dures.2 ' Because most leafy produce is grown in California, federal
agencies such as the Food and Drug Administration often examined
these regional industry-created documents with a degree of defer-
ence, incorporating them into its own guidance documents for pro-
ducers across the country.'
In terms of comprehensiveness, guidance documents are suc-
cessful at covering all relevant stages of the production process, and
in suggesting techniques that are scientifically effective methods to
curtail pathogen contamination." However, the greatest flaw of
guidance documents is suggested within its name: these documents
are merely advisory and have no mandatory regulatory force. In
29. See, e.g. INT'L FRESH-CUT PRODUCE Ass'N ET AL., COMMODITY SPECIFIC FOOD
SAFETY GUIDELINES FOR THE LETITUCE AND LEAFY GREENS SUPPLY CHAIN (1st ed.
2006), available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Food/FoodSafety/Product-
Specificlnformation/FruitsVegetablesJuices/GuidanceComplianceRegulatorylnfor-
mation/UCM169008.pdf [hereinafter IFPA GUIDELINES]. Guidance document GAP
guidelines are usually separated into three categories. First, Production and Har-
vesting Unit Operation guidelines suggest minimum standards of irrigation water
quality, soil and soil amendment quality, irrigation practices, and harvesting ma-
chine quality. Examples of such guidelines are procedures for maintaining an iso-
lated clean water supply for irrigation (such as use of a water supply which is fumi-
gated or solarized before used for irrigation), or the appropriate type of irrigation
method (such as dripping versus overhead sprinkling) based on the type of crop
and the environmental setting of the facility. Other guidelines set standards for soil
suitability, such as proper composting procedures to minimize the risk of pathogen
survival. The second category of guidelines, Postharvest Unit Operations, suggest
standards during the postharvest cooling of produce. Cooling apparatuses may
become contaminated if contact is made with tainted produce, soil, water, or hands.
These guidelines reiterate many Production and Harvesting guidelines, and suggest
further handling techniques. The third category of guidelines, Value Added and
Distribution Unit Operations, suggest standards for distribution preparation, trans-
portation, and in-house final processing of produce. Id. A final global category of
operations suggested general, year-round practices to avoid crop contamination,
such as strategic placement of toilet facilities away from growing areas, or baseline
hand-washing procedures. See FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, GUIDE TO MINIMIZE
MICROBIAL FOOD SAFETY HAZARDS FOR FRESH FRUITS AND VEGETABLES (1998), avail-
able at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Food/GuidanceDocuments/Produceand-
PlanProducts/UCM169112.pdf [hereinafter FDA GUIDE].
30. Compare IFPA GUIDELINES, supra note 29, with FDA GUIDE, supra note 29.
31. See Eschenbach Testimony, supra note 10 ("After enlisting the help of the
scientific community and the industry, FDA published the 'Guide to Minimize Mi-
crobial Food Safety Hazards for Fresh Fruits and Vegetables.' This
guide.. recommends good agricultural practices and good manufacturing practices
that growers, packers, and shippers can take to address common risk factors in
their operations. We have worked with the domestic and foreign fresh produce
industry since the release of this Guide to promote its recommendations and to
advance the scientific knowledge to enhance the safety of fresh produce").
274 [VOL. 6:267
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other words, producer compliance with these comprehensive guide-
lines had been entirely voluntary. No penalty was imposed on
growers for non-compliance with the guidance documents, nor was
there any immediate framework for state or federal agencies to im-
plement fines or other enforcement mechanisms." Because guid-
ance documents served as the plenary force for shaping agricultural
practices in leafy produce, producers did not face any mandatory
regulations before 2006.
B. Comparison of Leafy Produce Regulations with Other Industries
Compared to leafy (and generally, fresh) produce, other agri-
cultural industries have faced far more mandatory directives. For
instance, legislation such as the Meat Inspection Act removed a pre-
viously voluntary inspection program, and required federal employ-
ees to certify the safety of each meat product sold in interstate
commerce." By the 1980s, the USDA's Food Safety and Inspection
Service began to implement Hazard Analysis and Critical Control
Point (HACCP) regulations in addition to visual inspections." While
32. See supra note 25.
33. Supra note 6; Regulation of the meat industry has been expanded by
amendment to the original Act. See Wholesome Meat Act, Pub. L. No. 90-201, 81
Stat. 584 (1967); see also Kohnke, supra note 10, at 502 ("Unlike beef, poultry or
seafood, which have been subject to firm mandatory federal government controls
since the early 1990s, growers, processors, and shippers of fresh produce have suc-
cessfully avoided food safety regulations on both the state and federal levels.").
34. HACCP regulations have existed since the 1950s, but did not enjoy wide-
spread recognition until later. HACCP programs are typically supported by schol-
ars in that they represent a second preventative dimension to improving food safety
by eliminating contamination before it is manifested in food products. As one food
safety official put it, "it is easier to keep all needles out of the barn than to find the
needle in the haystack." Neal Fortin, The Hang-Up With HACCP: The Resistance to
Translating Science Into Food Safety Law, 58 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 565 (2003); see, e.g.,
Margie Russell, HACCP: What's the Hang-Up Food Engineering, Dec. 1995, at 48; see
also FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, FOOD CODE 530-531 (2009) (noting that
HACCP regulations are useful in that they are "the most effective and efficient way
to ensure that food products are safe."). While few argue against the principle of
H4ACCP regulations, there are practical limits to its success. As the process of creat-
ing HACCP regulations is primarily a science-driven, risk-assessment approach,
there are bound to be limits to the extent of scientific knowledge available on even
the most consumed items, much less in smaller agricultural commodities. Usually
the first scientific inquiry is the source and mechanism of contamination (often
referred to hazard and risk assessment). A secondary inquiry is identifying which
procedures are effective at eliminating these risks (known as critical control points).
A final scientific inquiry is a determination tolerable limits of the critical control
points (known as critical limits), such as minimum heating times, maximum non-
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inspections constitute a "command-and-control" type of regulation
(temporarily shifting responsibility for certifying the product's safety
to the inspector), HACCP regulations are a type of process control
mechanism, restoring responsibility for pathogen reduction and
control to the producer. Thus, meat, poultry, and other producers
are subject to both current-acting, product-point regulations, such as
inspection, and proactive, pre-production regulations, such as process
control rules, to prevent safety crises before they are found in the
product.
Before 2006, leafy producers were primarily subjected to the
latter type of regulation." Product-point regulations are simply im-
practical for implementation in the leafy produce context. No
agency or even producer can be reasonably expected to inspect
every leaf of its crops for impurity or pathogenic contamination.
On the other hand, the GAPs contained in guidance documents
typically indicate practices which specify preventative measures to
avoid contamination prior to cultivation.' But, as noted before, the
key indicator of regulatory exceptionalism" in leafy produce was the
refrigeration exposure time, etc. Beyond these scientific inquiries, a number of
administrative procedures must further be established, specifying a method of en-
forcement, a schedule of corrective action, and a system of verification. See id. at
505. Thus, most critiques of HACCP regulations usually point to gaps or lapses in
scientific data, which compromise the effectiveness of HACCP regulations and
allow for outbreaks. Very few scholars, however, criticize the mandatory nature of
HACCP guidelines (that compliance is required). This critique is usually reserved
for industry officials, who most usually cite cost concerns. See, e.g., Fortin, supra.
35. Although guidance documents are not H-ACCP regulations in practice (as
they are not mandatory), in theory, they similarly specify prospective steps to avoid
contamination before the end-product stage. See, e.g. supra note 17. However, even
with this theoretical similarity between formal HACCP regulations and GAPs of
guidance documents, some have expressed that inherent differences between pro-
duce industries and other commodities make GAP frameworks different. For in-
stance, the site of cultivation of produce usually occurs in an outdoors setting, as
opposed to meat slaughtering, processing, and most other agricultural industries.
Id. It is often conceded that raw products, which constitutes all produce, will con-
tain some bacteria even if GAP guidelines are closely followed. Thus, it may be that
GAP guidelines allow more tolerance in terms of possible contamination, and even
more, it is perhaps more difficult to determine the independent effectiveness of
GAP standards as compared to official HACCP regulations. See Caroline Smith
DeWaal, Delivering on HACCP's Promise to Improve Food Safety: A Comparison of Three
HACCP Regulations, 52 Food Drug L.J. 331 (1997), noting the special difficulties of
assessing raw products.
36. See Eschenbach Testimony, supra note 10.
37. This is the critical distinction between leafy (and generally all) produce and
most other industries, and is why I do not technically refer to GAPs in guidance
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lack of mandatory obligations imposed on growers. The HACCP-
like guidance documents simply could not force compliance or
threaten sanctions upon producers.
C. Sources of Leafy Produce Regulatory Exceptionalism
There are several possible explanations to account for the his-
torical non-regulation of produce as compared to other industries.
On the one hand, before the 2006 outbreak, crops such as lettuce
and spinach were not viewed as high-risk foods." While the source
of the public's historical trust of produce is uncertain, it most likely
stems from the lack of a widespread, well-publicized recall (as seen
in the meat industry), the lack of history of sensational accounts of
the fresh produce industry (such as an equivalent of TheJungle), and
the inherently differential nature between meat, coming from an
animal, and produce."
Unfortunately, the public's trust of the produce industry is not
consistent with industry's food safety track record. Compliance with
the GAPs contained in guidance documents was usually poor, with
large portions of small and midsized production firms even report-
ing unawareness of general guidelines.0 These low rates of compli-
ance under a voluntary regulatory framework were reflected in the
number of foodborne illnesses attributed to produce - specifically
leafy produce. Between 1990 and 2003, a majority of foodborne
documents as HACCP regulations - they are not regulations, but merely suggestions.
See supra notes 26-27, 31.
38. Chryssa V. Deliganis, Death by Apple juice: The Problem of Foodborne Illness, the
Regulatory Response and Further Suggestions for Reform, 53 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 681, 688
(1998); Kohnke, supra note 10, at 498.
39. Evidence of consumers' differential attitudes between produce and, for in-
stance, meat may be reflected in the preparation methods often used. Consumers
are far more likely to eat produce, especially leafy produce (such as packaged sal-
ads) without cooking or even washing the product as compared to meat. See, e.g.,
Food Safety: Current Challenges and New Ideas to Safeguard Consumers: Hearing Before
the S. Comm. on Health, Education, and Pensions, 109th Cong. 9 (2006) (statement of
Robert Brackett, Director, Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition, FDA)
[hereinafter Brackett Testimony].
40. See Center for Science in the Public Interest, Re: Comments on Proposed Pro-
duce Safety Action Plan (July 21, 2004), available at http://www.fda.gov/
ohrms/dockets/dailys/04/july4/072904/04N-0258-emcOO002-01.pdf (noting that
while larger growers tend to adhere to GAP guidelines, GAP "compliance is far
from universal," and that many producers were even unaware of or not complying
with guidance documents. CSPI's comment detailed a study surveying New York
farmers, finding that only 30% or growers were aware of GAPs for their particular
crop).
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illness outbreaks were attributed to contaminated produce, greater
than the number of illnesses caused by contaminated beef and eggs
combined." Leafy produce is particularly implicated in food con-
tamination occurrences. Further, despite the increasing breadth of
guidance documents in the 1990s, the number of leafy produce-
caused outbreaks doubled from 1998 to 2004.4 Another disturbing
trend is the increasing magnitude of outbreaks caused by leafy pro-
duce." Now, a single contaminated leaf may contaminate the leafy
vegetable supplies of dozens of states.4 1 In addition, the greater con-
sumption of leafy produce by consumers increases the likelihood of
foodborne illness from contamination." Despite these trends in
safety and in facility centralization prior to 2006, legislators and
agencies remained reluctant to promulgate mandatory regulations.
41. Kohnke, supra note 10, at 499; Daniel Akst, Big Farms Will Keep Spinach on




42. See Linda Calvin, Outbreak Linked to Spinach Forces Reassessment of Food Safety
Practice, AMBER WAVES, June 2007, available at http://www.ers.usda.gov/
AmberWaves/JuneO7/Features/Spinach.htm).
43. See Behind CSPI's Outbreak Data: A Look at the Produce Outbreak Numbers,
CENTER FOR SCIENCE IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST, http://www.cspinet.org/
foodsafety/produce data.pdf (last visited Nov. 15, 2010).
44. See MARION NESTLE, SAFE FOOD: BACTERIA, BIOTECHNOLOGY, AND
BIOTERRORIsM 43 (2003).
45. Deliganis, supra note 38, at 696 ("When a contamination problem occurs at
[a growing facility] a product may be distributed to thousands, or hundreds of
thousands, of people before the danger is discovered."); Kohnke, supra note 10, at
500 ("In today's marketplace, where the majority of distribution is conducted by a
few large scale processing plants that mix products from numerous farms, all it
takes is a single contaminated leaf to spoil a massive multi-state supply of leafy
greens.").
46. See Deliganis, supra note 38, at 698 (noting that produce eaten daily rose
from an average of 3.9 servings during 1989-1991 to 4.4 servings between 1991 and
1994).
47. Kohnke, supra note 10, at 502 ("Unlike beef, poultry or seafood, which have
been subject to firm mandatory federal government controls since the early 1990s,
growers, processors, and shippers of fresh produce have successfully avoided food
safety regulations on both the state and federal levels.").
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III. THE 2006 E. COLI SPINACH OUTBREAK
On September 14, 2006 the Centers for Disease Control (CDC)
alerted the nation of a widespread E. coli 0157:H7 outbreak." The
CDC linked the outbreak to fresh spinach produce, but was not ini-
tially aware of the source." In the ensuing weeks, hundreds of ill-
nesses were reported across 26 states, with three fatalities." After
pathogen genetic trace-back investigations of several suspected
farms, a single growing facility in the Salinas Valley" was implicated
as the source of one of the largest and deadliest outbreaks of food-
borne illness in recent years." The land was part of a cattle ranch
which was leased to a local spinach grower company." A report by
the FDA and the California Department of Health Services listed
several possible environmental causes of contamination, including
cross-contamination of irrigation reservoirs with nearby surface wa-
ter, feral pigs in the fields, and deficiencies in the producer's post-
harvest handling procedures."
The outbreak dealt a severe blow to produce farmers across the
nation. Nowhere was the impact more pronounced than in Califor-
nia, where dramatically slowed sales amounted to an estimated loss
of nearly $100 million to producers." Even though only a single
crop was involved, significant adverse economic effects were felt by
nearly every entity along the produce commodity chain, including
48. Press Release, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Multiple States
Investigating a Large Outbreak of E. coli 0157:H7 Infections (Sept. 14, 2006),
available at http://www2a.cdc.gov/han/ArchiveSys/ViewMsgV.asp?AlertNum=
00249.
49. Brackett Testimony, supra note 39, at 9.
50. Update on Multi-State Outbreak of E. coli 0157:H7 Infections From Fresh Spinach,
CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION (Oct. 6, 2006), http://www.
cdc.gov/foodborne/ecolispinach/100606.htm.
51. The Salinas Valley, often called the "Salad Bowl of the World," is home to a
heavy concentration of growers of leafy green vegetables, and accounts for the
majority of leafy vegetable production in the United States. See Rong-Gong Lin II,
E. Coli Outbreaks Prompt Review of Salinas Valley Lettuce Farms, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 11,
2006), http://www.marlerblog.com/ecolioutbreaks.pdf.
52. Id.; see also Jesse McKinley, Farmers Vow New Procedures; Bacteria Eyed in Boy's
Death, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 22, 2006), http://travel.nytimes.com/2006/09/22/
us/22spinach.html?partner-rssnyt&emc=rss.
53. Brackett Testimony, supra note 39, at 12.
54. Id.
55. See Spinach Farmers Try to Grow Public's Confidence, MSNBC.cOM (Oct. 2,
2006), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/15095551/.
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supermarkets, restaurants, and fresh-cut processors." Compound-
ing the effects of the spinach E. coli outbreak, a second outbreak in
the Northeast and Midwest involving contaminated lettuce" oc-
curred less than two months later, further increasing consumer re-
luctance to purchase fresh produce. The seemingly limited scope of
tainted produce thus led to widespread economic effects well be-
yond the spinach or lettuce growing industries.
IV. THE POST-OUTBREAK LEAFY PRODUCE
REGULATORY LANDSCAPE
Following the 2006 crisis, many believed the incident would
serve as a watershed moment in implementing mandatory regula-
tions on the fresh produce industry." However, federal agencies
normally charged with implementing food safety measures, such as
the FDA and USDA, continued to abstain from intervention." Even
more surprisingly, state legislators remained largely silent in setting
new regulatory proposals on the table. A single California state
senator proposed a two-tiered certification system, similar to the
56. See Elisa Odabashian, California Leafy Green Industry's Marketing Agreement
Will not Ensure Nation's Salad Bowl is Safe, CAL. PROGRESs REP. (July 25, 2007, 5:07
AM), http://www.californiaprogressreport.com/site?q=print/4146.
57. Press Release, Centers for Disease Control & Prevention, Multistate Out-
break of E. coli 0157 Infections, November-December 2006 (Dec. 14, 2006), avail-
able at http://www2a.cdc.gov/HAN/ArchiveSys/ViewMsgV.asp?AlertNum=00256.
58. See, e.g., Marian Burros, Who's Watching What We Eat?, N.Y. TIMES (May 16,
2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/16/dining/16fda.html?_r-3&pagewant-
ed=l&oref =slogin ("The cause [of food safety regulatory overhaul] gained momen-
tum in the past year as at least three people died and more than a thousand were
sickened by contaminated tomatoes, lettuce, peanut butter, and spinach..fThe
commissioner of the FDA] believes the agency can achieve its goals through volun-
tary guidelines. But the fresh-cut produce industry, hit hard by outbreaks in recent
years, has been virtually begging for stronger intervention."); Growers Pursue Safety
Program for Leafy Green Vegetables After E. coli Scares, USA TODAY (Jan. 25, 2007,
11:25 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/money/industries/food/2007-01-25-safety-
program.x.htm ("Growers, packers and shippers of leafy green vegetables, still
reeling from the impact of devastating E. coli outbreaks, moved this week to create
voluntary food-safety standards.. [T]he United Fresh Produce Association an-
nounced that to regain customer confidence, the industry needs national, manda-
tory produce-safety standards overseen by the federal government.").
59. Kohnke, supra note 10, at 505 ("With [a] strong record of federal govern-
ment involvement in the regulation of food safety, the lethal multi-state outbreaks
of E. coli..in 2006 linked to California-grown spinach and lettuce provided officials




regulations found in the meat industry.' Leafy producers quickly
assembled opposition, suggesting a competing proposal which
would ultimately prevail.
A. A Traditional Response: The State-Regulation Proposal
Following the 2006 outbreak, legislative calls for reform were
limited to a single proposal by California State Senator Dean
Florez." A vocal proponent of direct governmental involvement in
regulating produce, Senator Florez introduced the "California Pro-
duce Safety Action Plan" in the state legislature. 2 While the Plan
ultimately was defeated, it is nonetheless worth detailing because of
its utility in providing baseline regulatory solutions when assessing
the problems of the industry-driven plan adopted instead, and its
clean summary of the line of governmental regulation arguments
typically made by consumer advocate organizations.
Senator Florez's Plan consisted of three food safety bills seeking
to charge the California Department of Health Services (CDHS)"
with inspection and certification duties. The first bill, S.B. 200, au-
thorized the CDHS to "adopt recall, quarantine, and sanitary regula-
tions necessary to prevent, circumscribe, or eliminate any condition
where any produce or food processed from produce may carry..a
pathogen" (emphasis added, indicating both proactive and current-
acting regulations).' Most significantly, S.B. 200 required the CDHS
director to "establish and administer a leafy green vegetable inspec-
tion program," and enabled the CDHS to impose civil penalties for
non-compliance with departmental regulations."
60. Id. ("[T]he only serious legislative proposal to materialize in the aftermath of
[the] crisis came from Senator Florez, who firmly believed that a government-
regulated solution was the only appropriate response.").
61. (D-Shafter). Florez is the Chair of the California Senate Select Committee
on Foodborne Illness.
62. Frank D. Russo, Package of Major Food Safety Bills Introduced by California State
Senator Dean Florez, CAL. PROGREss REP. (Feb. 1, 2007, 7:41 AM), http://
www.californiaprogressreport.com/site/?q=print/4963.
63. The CDHS has recently been reorganized into two separate entities. The
most relevant agency today for purposes of food safety in California is the state
Department of Public Health.
64. See S.B. 200, 2007 Sess. (Cal. 2007) (emphasis added to indicate both proac-
tive and current-acting regulations).
65. Id. In addition, inspectors would be appointed by the CDHS Director, and
would review a facility's agricultural practices as well as conduct periodic tests on
water, soil, and produce quality. Id.
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The Plan's second bill, S.B. 201, prohibited producers from en-
gaging in specific production practices, essentially making previ-
ously-existing GAPs mandatory.' Further, the bill increased pun-
ishment of non-compliance by allowing for imposition of criminal
sanctions.
The Plan's final bill, S.B. 202, proposed a revamped facility or-
ganization system to assist in regulatory enforcement and post-
outbreak trace-backs." Specifically, the bill required growers to im-
plement a coded lot numbering system, and to assign each product
produced from a specific lot the corresponding lot number.
As mentioned above, none of the Plan's components passed,
running into opposition from Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger."
Instead, the leafy produce industry was left to craft a food safety
regulatory proposal.
B. Redefining the Top-Down Regulatory State: The Industry's Response
Western Growers Association (WGA), one of the largest and
most influential agricultural trade associations on the West Coast,"
proposed a marketing agreement plan to compel producers to
adopt GAPs and improve food safety." Marketing agreements are
66. See S.B. 201, 2007 Sess. (Cal. 2007). Examples of restricted practices in-
cluded using surface water in irrigation, allowing cross-contamination of irrigation
water supply with surface water, using improperly composted manure as fertilizer,
maintaining toilet facilities in or adjacent to growing fields, or using irrigation water
exceeding acceptable pathogen levels. The CDHS would also be required to de-
velop model checklists to help producers comply with the bill's provisions.
67. Id.
68. See S.B. 202, 2007 Sess. (Cal. 2007).
69. Approximately a month after its introduction, a spokeswoman for Governor
Arnold Schwarzenegger stated that the Governor preferred an "industry-regulated
solution," and GOP state senator Abel Maldonado said through a spokeswoman
that because industry actors "have a very vested interest in ensuring [product
safety]," self-policing was a reasonable solution. Marla Cone, Gov.'s Stance an Obsta-
cle for Spinach Safety Bills, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 1, 2007), http://articles.latimes.com/
2007/mar/01/local/me-spinachl. Some of the bills did enjoy legislative success -
S.B. 200 initially passed in the senate, but was re-referred to the State Senate Com-
mittee on Agriculture, where it died; S.B. 201 managed to pass in the state assembly
and senate, only to be vetoed by Governor Schwarzenegger. Insufficient support to
overturn the veto marked the end of S.B. 201's run.
70. Western Growers represents over 90% of all fresh produce growers in Cali-
fornia and Arizona, consisting of over 3,000 members. Who We Are, WESTERN
GROWERS ASS'N, http-//www.wga.com/default.php?id=153&pagename=WhoWeAre
(last visited Nov. 15, 2010).
71. CAL. DEP'T OF FOOD AND AGRIC., CALIFORNIA LEAFY GREEN PRODUCTS
HANDLER MARKETING AGREEMENT (Mar. 5, 2007), available at
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voluntary programs that ensure products sold under the agreement
comply with particular predetermined regulations.' Membership
under an agreement, however, is not compulsory. Thus, producers
face no concrete regulation or enforcement threat from such
agreements; rather, the largest threats are imposed by consumers'
perception of a non-participating product's inferiority in the mar-
ketplace."
WGA's plan proposed the formation the Leafy Greens Market-
ing Agreement (LGMA) between the California Department of Food
and Agriculture (CDFA) and leafy produce "handlers" - defined as
any entity (except retail establishments) that "handles, processes,
ships, or distributes" leafy produce. Under the LGMA, the CDFA
would be charged with determining whether growers and handlers
http://www.caleafygreens.ca.gov/members/documents/LGMAmarketingagreeme
nt03.08_000.pdf [hereinafter LGMA].
72. See G.B. Wood, Marketing Agreements and Orders - Without Production Controls,
1961 INCREASING UNDERSTANDING OF PUB. PROBS. & POL'y 69, available at
http-//ageconsearch.umn.edu/bitstream/17627/1/ar610069.pdf.
73. Marketing agreements tap into consumer demand to impose a force of mar-
ket-driven coercion to join the agreement. See Linda Calvin, Outbreak Linked to
Spinach Forces Reassessment of Food Safety Practices, AMBER WAVES, June 2007, available
at http://www.ers.usda.gov/AmberWaves/June07/Features/Spinach.htm ("To
protect its competitive position and to minimize the risk of outbreaks elsewhere
that would further shake consumer confidence in leafy greens, the California indus-
try is considering whether to pursue a Federal marketing agreement or order that
would cover the entire U.S. leafy green industry."); Henrich Brunke et al., Industry-
Mandated Testing to Improve Food Safety: the New US Marketing Order for Pista-
chios (Aug. 20, 2004) (draft), available at http://aic.ucdavis.edu/researchl/
GermanPistachiosOnlineDraft0-25-04.pdf ("The marketing order is intended to
reduce the odds of an [outbreak], mitigate the consequences if an event should
occur, provide some quality assurance to buyers, and offset the negative conse-
quences of concerns over the potential for a food scare..."); Hank Giclas, Vice
President, Western Growers Association, Presentation to the National Restaurant
Assocuation: CA Leafy Greens Marketing Agreement & Marketing Order,
available at http://www.restaurant.org/pdfs/events/foodsafety/200703produce-
safety/giclas.pdf ("To restore and enhance the confidence of consumers, regulators
buyers and other interested parties a mandatory program that will help ensure
100% of the industry complying with 'best practices' 100% of the time is neces-
sary."); Press Release, Dean Florez, Florez Will Introduce Legislation to Enhance
Training, Monitoring and Enforcement (Dec. 15, 2006), available at http://
distl6.casen.govoffice.com/index.aspTypeB_PR&SEC={5E36B143-3FBF-4945-AD03-
OBAE9ED9CB67}&DE={740286F9-88EE-48B3-A80D-12FO562AB04E} ("The indus-
try contends that consumer demand for certified produce would force growers to
participate in the program to remain competitive.").
74. LGMA, supra note 71, at Article II, Section A(6).
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operated in compliance with GAPs.7 ' These GAPs, however, would
be largely industry-driven as opposed to promulgated by the CDFA
itself.' Handlers signing on to the LGMA are prohibited from pur-
chasing produce from growers found to operate in violation of
GAPs, or not subject to periodic inspection by the CDFA."
Handlers abiding by the LGMA could, in turn, display a seal of
approval, certifying membership in the Agreement and that the
produce was a product of optimal practices." Further, the terms of
the agreement focused on entities closer to the end-consumer along
the commodity chain.' In essence, the LGMA called upon a state
75. Id. at Article V, Section C(1)(a) (stating that growers are "subject to periodic
inspection by..state agricultural regulatory agency").
76. While the CDFA must approve any regulations suggested by the Leafy
Greens Advisory Board, the Board may recommend GAP rules and also is the pri-
mary information-gathering entity under the Agreement. See id. at Article III, Sec-
tion D.
77. Id. at Article V, Section C(2)(a). Additionally, handlers are required to fol-
low special GAPs in transport and processing.
78. The seal of approval is referred to as a "certification mark." See id. at Article
V. Under the terms of the LGMA, sanctions on handler non-compliance amount to
suspension or revocation of the right to display or market such certification. A
handler's first "flagrant or repeated violation" results in a suspension of the privi-
lege to display a certification seal for two weeks. One of three criteria must be met
in order to constitute such a violation: 1) the handler "knew the product was. ..
produced in violation of handler or grower best management practices, and chose
to [purchase] regardless"; 2) the handler had received prior best management prac-
tice (GAP) violation notices of the same type previously; 3) the handler received
prior violations regarding record-keeping requirements. A second flagrant or re-
peated violation results in an indefinite suspension of the privilege to display certi-
fication, until the handler establishes a "Corrective Action Plan" (CAP). A flagrant
or repeated violation occurring after the filing of a CAP results in a two year sus-
pension of certification privilege, unless the handler "demonstrates a significant
change in management and brand." Disputes over imposed sanctions proceed via
informal hearing before an independent arbiter whose decisions are "final." Id. at
Article V, Section D; see also CAL. LEAFY GREEN PRODUCTs HANDLER MKTG.
AGREEMENT, ANNUAL REPORT 2007-2008 6 (2008), available at
http://gna.mjrcgdev.com/sites/default/files/07.08_AnnualReport.pdf [herein-
after ANNUAL REPORT].
79. Placing the certification process at the "handler" level, as opposed to merely
growers, is a highly strategic attribute of the LGMA. Since marketing agreements
must rely upon consumer demand to give value to a certification mark (otherwise,
certification is nothing but a "pat on the back"), that demand is most cognizable in
firms situated higher in the commodity chain, such as grocers, distributors, proces-
sors, and general retail establishments. See generally supra note 73. But see Fresh
Express Declines to Sign California Marketing Agreement, PERISHABLE PUNDrr (Feb. 14,
2007), http://www.perishablepundit.com/index.php?date=02/14/07&pundit=l
(describing the refusal of a large leafy vegetable grower to enter the LGMA on the
ground that the seal of certification strategy may "give consumers a false sense of
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agency to enforce privately promulgated rules within a, at best, quasi-
private mass contractual agreement.
Soon after the LGMA was proposed, the CDFA accepted the
terms of the Agreement."o Within six months of enactment, 51 han-
dlers, constituting over 99 percent of leafy produce crops grown in
California, had entered into the LGMA."' Thus, it appears that the
industry's proposal soundly defeated calls for a more traditional
governmental regulatory response. Indeed, the LGMA is often seen
as a model of food safety reform even at the federal level, as some
have proposed the incorporation of a National Leafy Greens Mar-
keting Agreement." Because of the rapidly growing popularity of
LGMA-style arrangements, analysis of marketing agreements is par-
ticularly critical from a food safety policy standpoint.
V. CRITICAL ASSESSMENT OF THE LGMA
In this section, I provide two general categories of criticism of
the LGMA. The first line of criticism contends that the authoritative
body responsible for setting GAPs is not subjected to sufficient
oversight or even equal participation by the agency it purports to
cooperate with. As a result, the promulgation of less effective or
non-effective regulations may occur. The second general criticism is
that even if GAP regulations are independently effective, there is no
guarantee that they will continue to be followed down the road, or
even that they will be followed now.
With the exception of the very last argument, all of these cri-
tiques point to structural deficiencies in the Agreement that raise
prospective concerns. The fact that most of these consequences are
only possibilities suggests that these current issues with the LGMA
are relatively quick-fixes, correctable with simple modifications of
the Agreement terms. On the other hand, the LGMA is blessed
with two key strengths - thriftiness and speed. Thus, it seems that
while the LGMA indeed contains flaws, some of which are capable
of producing dire consequences, the easily correctable nature of
security and that both the press and consumers could misinterpret what the seal
stands for").
80. See Press Release, Cal. Dep't of Food and Agric., Leafy Greens Marketing
Agreement Sets Compliance Audit Start Date, available at http://www.cdfa.ca.
gov/egov/PressReleases/PressRelease.asp?PRnum=07-054 (last visited June 21,
2010).
81. See Cone, supra note 69; Kohnke, supra note 10, at 510.
82. See supra note 19.
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these flaws and the pre-existing virtues of the Agreement make it
worth keeping as a tool for improving food safety in leafy produce.
A. Are the Agricultural Standards (GAPs) Under the Industry Approach
Effective in Improving Food Safety?
Recall the two historical characteristics of the leafy produce in-
dustry: (1) it has not been subjected to onerous top-down mandatory
regulations," and (2) its food safety track record has been relatively
poor.' Based on these two characteristics, a glaring question in the
LGMA's GAP rulemaking process is whether an industry-driven ap-
proach can be trusted to create effective (i.e. both scientifically effec-
tive and reasonably practicable) GAPs.'
To answer this question, it is necessary to first gauge just how
industry-driven the authoritative body charged with creating rules is.
Within the LGMA, member handlers and their producers are re-
quired to abide by GAPs promulgated through a centralized proc-
ess. Under the Agreement, the Leafy Greens Advisory Board
(LGAB) releases official notice of accepted GAPs to growers and
handlers.' This rulemaking process differs substantially from that in
other agricultural industries, where required rules of Best Practices
are formed through traditional governmental rulemaking processes,
including Notice and Comment periods, and are subjected to mini-
mum procedural and decision-making requirements," such as those
83. See supra notes 25-27.
84. See supra notes 40-42.
85. Many have cited these characteristics to answer this inquiry in the negative.
See, e.g., Kohnke, supra note 10, at 512-513 (describing the responses by Senator
Florez and other consumer advocacy groups, arguing that "it was unacceptable for
the creation of GAPs to be left to the same industry that had caused twenty-two
food-borne illness outbreaks since 1995" and that the "self-regulatory approach
[was] nothing more than the 'fox [guarding] the henhouse"').
86. See LGMA, supra note 71, at Article III, Section D.
87. See, e.g., Joseph M. Pocius, The Truth and Consequence of "Standards of Identity,"
52 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 337, 337 (1997) (describing proposed rulemaking action by
the USDA's Food Safety and Inspection Service recommendations of acceptable
meat and poultry contents revealed through inspection); See generally Denis Stearns,
Preempting Food Safety: An Examination of USDA Rulemaking and Its E. coli 0157:H7
Policy in Light of Estate of Kriefall ex rel Kriefall v. Excel Corporation, I J. FOOD L.
& POL'Y 375 (2005) (discussing USDA proposed rulemaking to characterize meat
products contaminated with E. coli bacteria as adulterated and to implement a
testing program); Margaret Glavin, Update on FSIS Initiatives, 53 FOOD & DRUG L.J.
337, 338 (1998) (describing FSIS proposed rulemaking "that focuses on egg safety
during production, packing, processing, labeling, distribution, retail, and prepara-
tion - and seeks a rational, comprehensive, and cost-effective approach").
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contained in the Administrative Procedure Act.' Simply put, the
Board is not subjected to an APA equivalent, and may unilaterally
promulgate new GAPs without any consideration of data or input
from industry or public entities. Further, the terms of
the Agreement specify that the Board must consist of between seven
and thirteen signatory handlers." In contrast, only one board
member may represent the CDFA on behalf of the general public."
Therefore, the Board is numerically dominated by industry per-
sonnel.
The structure and enhanced rulemaking functions of the LGAB
create three prospective consequences. First, this setup severely
detracts from the "new governance" advantages to which LGMA
proponents point by inhibiting mutual sharing of knowledge and
data between industry and government, and by eliminating mean-
ingful agency review of industry practices. Second, it provides no
assurance that newly promulgated GAPs will be economically feasi-
ble for smaller farms, which historically have struggled to comply
with GAPs. Taken to the extreme, the Board's lack of concern of
practicability may create the potential for market abuse and hegem-
ony of larger producers and handlers. Finally, specific GAPs, while
scientifically supported in promoting food safety, may also contrib-
ute to several adverse environmental effects, ranging from erosion
promotion to biodiversity concerns. Although this critique is not
particularly a food safety concern, it is nonetheless a negative con-
sequence of the LGMA worth briefly exploring to examine if food
safety policy and environmental protection can coexist within the
terms of the LGMA. These effects will be explored in the following
paragraphs.
88. See, e.g., DeWaal Testimony, supra note 25, at 4 (noting the FDA's rulemak-
ing authority under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, which has not been exer-
cised in the area of fresh produce food safety); see also Cindy Skrzycki, Cattlemen
Have Beef With USDA Signals on Canadian Imports, WASHINGTON POST (May 11,
2004), http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A16232-2004May10?language
=printer (describing a dispute between ranchers and the USDA due to the agency's
allowance of Canadian beef imports without following the normal notice and com-
ment rulemaking requirements under the Act). The Act allows limited judicial
review of agency decisionmaking, including whether actions were decided on arbi-
trary bases. See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2006).
89. See LGMA, supra note 71, at Article III, Section A.
90. Id.
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1. Regulatory Cooperation or Hegemony?
From its establishment, supporters of the LGMA hailed the
Agreement as an unprecedented cooperative venture between gov-
ernment and industry.' Perhaps, on its surface, the LGMA appears
as what "new governance"' proponents envision: a system of gov-
ernmental "learning through monitoring" rather than mere en-
forcement, enhancing industry benchmarking and a free exchange
of information, thus maximizing the quality of ideas and standards
promulgated."
But this argument both underestimates the importance of wide-
spread public participation under a new governance scheme and
overestimates the CDFA's role under the LGMA. As noted above,
the LGAB is the authoritative rule-promulgating body under the
Agreement. But the Agreement's terms permit the "veiled" prom-
ulgation of rules - there is no requirement for the Board to hold
any sort of notice and comment period to collect data from either
various industry actors or members of the public. Instead, the
Board may unilaterally set GAP standards without traditional proce-
91. See Press Release, Western Growers Association, Western Growers Board
Takes Action to Require Mandatory Food Safety Practices (Oct. 30, 2006), available
at http://www.wga.com/public/active/siteBuilder/templateNewsReleasePopup.
php?id=70.
92. The "New Governance" movement has become a trendy position in recent
years. The basic premise of new governance theory is that traditional command-
and-control model of state enforcement of its regulations suffers from both uncer-
tainty in changing market landscapes and inefficiency at adapting to these changes.
As a result, regulations become outdated and subject to both low levels of compli-
ance and legitimacy of agency actions. See Jason M. Solomon, Law and Governance
in the 21st Century Regulatory State, 86 TEx. L. REv. 819 (2008) (book review). In-
stead, new governance proponents suggest a greater cooperative effort between
agency and industry, implementing mechanisms for shared data collection and
information gathering, mutual investments in industry-assisting technology, and the
exchange of best practice benchmarks, leading to optimal public participation and
maximization of efficiency. See generally Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Con-
stitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REv. 267 (1998).
93. Solomon, supra note 92, at 823 ("The kinds of regulation encompassed in
the term new governance tend to be less prescriptive, less top-down, and more fo-
cused on learning through monitoring than compliance with fixed rule...[N]ew
governance mechanisms share emphasis on regulation through 'centrally coordi-
nated local problem solving.' Both in defining the problem to be addressed and
devising solutions, new governance forms emphasize provisionality and revisability
in light of experience. The public agency acts to help local actors learn from one
another about best practices...").
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dural or reviewing requirements.' Thus, the LGMA's enhancement
of a Board's rule-setting power represents an even more centralized,
top-down, and potentially arbitrary method of rule creation than
under a typical agency regime.
An opposite indication may be gleaned from the LGMA's pro-
vision requiring Board decisions to be approved by the CDFA. Offi-
cially, the Secretary of Food and Agriculture's approval signifies that
promulgated GAPs will be enforced via CDFA audits." But all that
is required to promulgate a new standard pending CDFA approval is
the majority support of the Board." While a rule pending agency
approval may seem insignificant, in fact, the ability of the industry
actors of the Board to advance GAP rules to the desk of the Secre-
tary without an effort to gather or review data and public input in-
hibits meaningful agency oversight of the decisions of the Board."
For example, assume that the Board wished to promulgate a
GAP rule requiring installation of a newly invented water microbe
meter in all water reserves. Also assume that the vast majority of
94. See LGMA, supra note 71, at Article III, Section F. No language in the LGMA
terms suggests the sort of rulemaking procedures described at supra note 87.
95. See id. at Article III, Section D.
96. See id. at Article III, Section F(2).
97. New governance theory depends upon the ability of state agencies to both
collect and distribute shared information to relevant industry entities. For instance,
Grainne de B6rca has written extensively on the new governance experience in the
European Union. The EU has adopted "Open Methods of Coordination" in several
substantive areas, even including the establishment of fundamental rights. For
instance, the EU Council adopted a directive to implement principles of equal
treatment to member states, but left states to incorporate such policies in a patently
new governance fashion - via "the monitoring of workplace practices, collective
agreements, [and] research or exchange of experiences and good practices." Simi-
lar practices have been used for improving health care systems. The result was
improvement of administrative efficiency and governmental enlightenment to im-
proving benchmarking and oversight functions. Thus, state agencies actively sought
data in order to monitor effectively, rather than hoping for data to seek them.
Grtinne de Bfirca, EU Race Discrimination Law: A Hybrid Model?, in LAW AND NEW
GOVERNANCE IN THE EU AND THE US 97, 99-101 (GrAinne de Bi6rca & Joanne Scott
eds., 2006). This illustrates that viable cooperative efforts must still pit governmen-
tal agencies as the ultimate manager and distributor of data. The state's "monitor-
ing" function (which the LGMA uses) relies upon collection of data to be able to
assess the conduct it is overseeing. But the LGMA does not place agencies in a
position to centrally dictate the terms of information collections. Not only does it
subject agencies to a numerical minority within the body which initial creates rules,
but places the power of the purse with the industry-dominated Board. See LGMA, supra
note 71, at Article III, Section D(12) (granting the Board the function of disbursing
funds to the CDFA). Thus, the agency is at the Board's mercy to facilitate informa-
tion gathering sessions - a result thoroughly in conflict with the benefits of a new
governance arrangement.
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LGAB members voted in favor of the rule, but without holding an
information-gathering session or without allowing public comment.
Because of the majority vote, the rule advances to the Secretary for
approval. But without any statistical data on the efficacy of the mi-
crobe meter, the Secretary cannot effectively challenge the sugges-
tion of the Board.
The rate of CDFA approval of Board-proposed standards indi-
cates such a trend of blind approval - the CDFA has yet to reject any
action of the Board thus far." Although this overlap could be
chalked up to genuine concurrence between the two entities, the
underlying systemic deficiency detailed above nonetheless provides
a reasonable alternative explanation.
Thus, the strength in numbers of industry actors within the
Board allows for the suppression of information gathering mecha-
nisms, such as mandatory notice and comment periods, depriving
both the agency representative of the Board and the Secretary of the
resources necessary for dissent, and necessitating a practice of rub-
ber-stamping by the "overseeing" agency."
These characteristics make it more apparent that the Board
structure of the LGMA is not as cooperative as it initially seemed.
Yet, the lack of external, APA-like requirements in the LGAB's deci-
sion-making process may allow for the arbitrary exercise of the
Board's top-down power to create rules, though not necessarily in
line with the independent effectiveness of those rules adopted.
98. See Sally Greenberg, Senior Counsel, Consumers Union, Comments to the
FDA at the Public Meeting on Regulatory Options: Safety of Fresh Fruits and Vege-
tables (Apr. 13, 2007), available at http://www.consumersunion.org/pub/
0413FDACommentsFreshProduce.pdf; Elisa Odabashian, Director, West Coast
Office, Consumers Union, Comments to California Senate Select Committee on
Food-Borne Illness at the Public Informational Hearing on the California Depart-
ment of Food and Agriculture's California Leafy Green Marketing Agreement (Feb.
28, 2007), available at http://www.consumersunion.org/pub/200 7/02/004283
print.html (noting that the practice of the CDFA was to simply "take the advice of
the industry on the best practices").
99. Such a concern is echoed by consumer watchdog organizations. See, e.g.,
Odabashian, supra note 98 ("We are seriously concerned that the industry appears
to intend to create its Best Practices standards behind closed doors, that it will be
overseen by a Board made up almost exclusively of industry representatives, and
that enforcement will amount to a simple rubber stamp by the California Depart-
ment of Food and Agriculture (CDFA). Under state and federal law, standards are
almost always put forward for Notice and Comment, so that the entire public has
an opportunity to give input..This has the beneficial effect of getting input from a
wide range of sources and experts, some of whom may have been previously un-
known to the drafters of the standard.").
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2. LGMA Board Structure and Practicability Concerns
Recall the definition of "effectiveness" provided above - that
GAPs are scientifically effective and reasonably practicable. After
all, even the most scientifically-supported GAP rules are ineffective
at improving food safety when they are only economically imple-
mentable in a marginal number of facilities. The concern, then, is
that inadequate representation of either a public agency or smaller
farms on the Board reduces consideration of feasibility of compli-
ance with GAPs imposed on (particularly smaller) growers and han-
dlers, thereby compromising the overall effectiveness of GAPs in
terms of practicability.
Skepticism of an approach charging a select group of large
firms with the task of determining the economic abilities of smaller
firms is justified. To see this, compare the GAP rulemaking process
under the LGMA with the process in the pre-2006 fresh produce
industry. As explained earlier, under the old framework, industry
associations such as the WGA and the IFPA created and released
guidance documents providing voluntary suggestions for improving
agricultural practices." State and federal agencies reviewed these
documents with a healthy dose of deference and typically adopted
the guidelines verbatim, without conducting independent informa-
tion-gathering mechanisms."0 ' The pre-2006 framework, therefore,
was largely industry-driven. But under this old framework, rates of
GAP compliance among small firms were both substantially less than
large firms and relatively abysmal." While several factors arguably
may account for this disparity,"O it nonetheless provides some base-
line evidence that an industry-driven regime tends to cater to the
100. See supra note 29.
101. To see this, note the similarity between IFPA GUIDELINES, supra note 29, and
FDA GUIDE, supra note 29.
102. See Center for Science in the Public Interest, supra note 40.
103. The lone premise of poor historical compliance rates generally concentrated
among smaller farms does not necessarily mean that the GAPs promulgated under
the pre-2006 framework were impracticable. For instance, smaller farms may have
withheld GAP compliance in order to maximize profits and better compete with
increasingly large firms. But see ELANOR STARMER, FOOD AND WATER WATCH, &
MARIE KULICK, INST. FOR AGRIc. & TRADE PoLIcY, BRIDGING THE GAPs: STRATEGIES
TO IMPROVE PRODUCE SAFETY, PRESERVE FARM DIVERSITY AND STRENGTHEN LOCAL
FOOD SYSTEMS 5 (Sept. 2009), available at
http://www.iatp.org/iatp/publications.cfm?accountlD=258&reflD=106746 (stating
that a "weakness of the LGMA is that it cannot be easily adopted by small and mid-
sized farms," and noting that small-farm voices were not considered until very late
stages in the LGMA development process).
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most influential (i.e. largest) firms, implementing rules (voluntary or
not) which are clearly not universally attainable.
Under the LGMA, industry associations, now in the form of the
LGAB, again dictate GAP promulgation and minimally leave the
door open to marginal approval by the CDFA. In other words, the
regulatory landscape has changed little. Without affirmative rules
constraining the maximum and minimum number of Board mem-
bers from large, midsized, and small firms, there will always be a
theoretical possibility that the smaller firms will be unable to meet
the demands of GAPs promulgated by a large firm-dominated
Board.
Both empirical and qualitative evidence of impracticability is
surfacing. A survey of a representative sample leafy produce farms"
indicated that large farms' reported the lowest amount of food
safety costs in response to compliance with the GAPs of the
LGMA." Small farms, on the other hand, reported substantially
higher food safety costs per acre, including installation of fencing
and irrigation renovation.' Further, larger farms reported a far
higher rate of employment of food safety specialists to advise them
on compliance with GAPs Small farms, however, reported a neg-
ligible rate of employing such specialists.I" The report concluded
104. Shermain D. Hardesty & Yoko Kusunose, Growers' Compliance Costs for the
Leafy Greens Marketing Agreement and Other Food Safety Programs, UC SMALL FARM
PROGRAM RESEARCH BRIEF (Sept. 2009), available at http://www.sfc.ucdavis.edu/
docs/leafygreens.pdf.
105. Id. The survey classified farms according to average annual revenue, but
slightly altered the USDA definitions of "small" farms (under $250,000 annual
revenue) by essentially creating five size designations - very small farms (under
$250,000 annual revenue), small farms (between $250,000 and $500,000), mid-sized
farms (between $500,000 and $1 million), large farms ($1 million to $10 million),
and very large farms (over $10 million). Nearly 80% of farms represented in the
survey were large or very large farms. In addition, the survey found that farm reve-
nue closely correlated with farm acreage, and that most growers for LGMA han-
dlers were fairly specialized in leafy produce (rather than cultivating multiple
crops). Id.
106. Id. at 9-10. In 2007, very large farms reported an average of $33.22 seasonal
food safety costs per acre, as compared to $38.57 for small and mid-sized farms. A
more telling indicator of disparate effects of the LGMA, very large farms reported
average modification costs (costs to comply with GAPs) of $8.29 per acre, as com-
pared with $14.82 per acre for small and mid-sized farms.
107. Id.
108. Id. Very large farms reported food safety specialist costs four times higher
than small and mid-sized farms. In 2006, small and mid-sized farms did not report
any costs (indicating that few, if any, retained food safety specialists).
109. Shermain D. Hardesty & Yoko Kusunose, Growers' Compliance Costs for the
Leafy Greens Marketing Agreement and Other Food Safety Programs, UC SMALL FARM
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that smaller farms are particularly vulnerable because of an inability
to pass these costs on to grocers and other handlers."o These statis-
tics thus provide further evidence that the GAPs promulgated, while
certainly comprehensive, are simply not practicable for all firms.
For more qualitative evidence of the possible infeasibility of
GAPs promulgated by a Board dominated by large industry actors,
consider the statements of critique filed by small farms. For in-
stance, the Community Alliance with Family Farmers (CAFF) issued
a Comment of opposition of the LGMA to the USDA, indicating
that a lack of small-scale farm representation on the Board led to the
creation of GAPs which are infeasible for small farmers and organic
growers."' Instead, the CAFF urged a "more practical... approach
to food safety that diverse, traditional farmers of all sizes could im-
plement.""... The position of small, family farm establishments pro-
vides a clear indication that the lack of diverse representation on the
standard-promulgating Board amounts to the creation of impractical
GAPs.
While a lack of representation of small firms within the LGAB
may impede consideration of feasibility of GAP compliance by the
smallest farms, the setup is also a recipe for rampant market abuse.
If a select group of large firms decide to promulgate GAPs which
impose prohibitive costs of compliance on smaller farms, these mar-
ginal establishments will effectively be forced out of the LGMA."' If
consumer demand is sufficiently tied to safety concerns, the lack of
PROGRAM RESEARCH BRIEF (Sept. 2009), available at http://www.sfc.ucdavis.
edu/docs/leafygreens.pdf.
110. Id. at 11 ("It seems unlikely that growers have been able to obtain higher
prices in order to cover part or all of their increased food safety compliance
costs..the highly consolidated grocery sector often pays below perfectly competitive
prices..Our results indicate that growers with revenues over $10 million benefit
from significant economies of size in complying with the LGMA and other food
safety provisions; therefore they have the greatest capacity to absorb these costs.
Operations with sales between $1 million and $10 million appear to be the most
vulnerable, but operations with sales under $1 million could also incur high com-
pliance costs. Furthermore, the owners/managers of these small operations do not
have the personnel-neither the food safety specialists nor the management teams-
to whom they can delegate the effort of reviewing food safety regulations and com-
pleting administrative activities").
111. Community Alliance with Family Farmers, Comment on Proposed Federal
Rules for Leafy Greens (Nov. 27, 2007), available at
http://www.caff.org/policy/documents/ USDAComments_44.pdf.
112. Id.
113. Id. The Comment notes that under the LGMA, "food safety rules [are] con-
trolled by..handlers and processors and will unnecessarily drive many.. traditional
leafy green growers out of the business."
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LGMA certification could spell doom for smaller firms. Indeed
small farms have repeatedly expressed this concern."' In other
words, an authoritative Board composed solely of large firm repre-
sentatives (as it is currently constituted) could engage in a tactic of
"predatory standardizing," temporarily imposing overly-onerous
GAP rules with the intent of driving smaller firms out of business.
LGMA supporters may counter on two grounds. First, they
may argue that the composition of the Board is ultimately set by the
CDFA, and thus, there is no default guarantee that the Board will
only be comprised of large firm representatives. While the argu-
ment is theoretically correct (the Secretary of the CDFA must con-
firm Board appointments), it is particularly noteworthy that no rep-
resentative of a small or mid-sized farm has ever been appointed to
the LGAB."' Therefore, while placing the duties of Board appoint-
ment with an independent agency seems to be a procedurally inde-
pendent method of filling the LGAB, the absence of concrete Board
composition rules has created a strong de facto preference for large
firm representatives."'
A second possible argument which could be made in defense of
the LGMA is that concerns of future market abuse and impractica-
bility of GAPs are purely speculative. The argument goes that the
near universal participation rates of firms"' indicates that the GAPs
promulgated thus far have not been overly onerous, and that no
market abuse has been observed. Again, the argument is theoreti-
cally correct. But reliance on a current snapshot of the LGMA,
without any concern for future LGMA participation within the con-
text of dynamic factors which play into an individual firm's decision
on whether to remain in the LGMA, is misguided. Necessarily, an
ideal strategy contains such a prospective viewpoint. As all firms
(but especially small firms) seem to engage in some cost-benefit
analysis weighing whether LGMA certification is worth the extra
114. Id.
115. See id.
116. 1 am hesitant to offer a mechanism explaining why large farm representatives
have dominated the composition of the Board because there is, frankly, little dis-
cussion of the CDFA's appointment decisions available. Nonetheless, a possible
account stems from the same rationale provided in the preceding section - because
the Board is granted the ability to advance a decision directly to the Secretary with-
out any consideration requirements. The agency is then left without the necessary
time or information to effectively challenge the decision of the Board.
117. See Kohnke, supra note 10, at 510.
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costs of GAP compliance,"' concerns of practicability must arise
when (1) the force of consumer demand can constantly change, and
(2) the industry's history indicates a lack of attention to economic
feasibility of suggested GAPs."' Thus, while LGMA proponents are
correct in asserting that the pitfalls mentioned above are only poten-
tial issues, a strategy that eliminates even prospective problems
should be pursued.
3. Environmental Concerns
A number of conservation and environmental advocacy groups
have criticized the LGMA for fostering a farm environment that is
too sterile, beyond what science seems to suggest as the necessary
means to eliminate E. coli and other pathogenic contamination.x1o
As a result, biodiversity and wildlife conservation efforts suffer at
the hands of overreaching GAPs.
The primary tension between conservationists and LGMA pro-
ponents has been the imposition of "super metrics" - stringent
standards attempting to rid farming areas of any wildlife. 2 ' As a
118. See generally Hardesty & Kusunose, supra note 104 (indicating that it is
unlikely growers are able to reflect the costs of compliance in the price of their
crops, because the grocery sector typically pays below-market prices. Thus, large
farms are most able to absorb compliance costs, whereas small farms are far more
vulnerable. Further, reduced profit margin discourages smaller establishments
from retaining food safety specialists, impairing their ability to comprehend guide-
lines or complete administrative activities.); see also Conservation Concerns Regarding
a Proposed National Leafy Green Marketing Agreement, WILD FARM ALLIANCE,
http://wildfarmalliance.org/Press%20Room/press_ room_ NationalLGMA.htm
(noting that compliance expenses will most likely be reflected in profit margin
rather than market price, and that "not many farmers could make ends meet and
comply with the LGMA at this rate").
119. The poor compliance rates of voluntary GAPs under the pre-LGMA regime
among small farms, discussed at supra notes 40-41, illustrates inattention to attain-
ing universal attainment of GAPs.
120. See, e.g., WILD FARM ALLIANCE, supra note 118; Elly Hopper, Of Mice and Men,
TERRAIN MAGAZINE, Spring 2009, available at http://ecologycenter.org/terrain/
spring-2009/of-mice-and-men/; Len Richardson, Sterile Farming Adds to Food Risk,
CALIFORNIA FARMER, Jan. 2009, available at http://magissues.farmprogress.com/
CLF/CF01Jan09/clf012.pdf; Growers Pushed Too Far in Efforts to Provide Safe Food,
RODALE INST., http://www.rodaleinstitute.org/20080619/n2 (last visited Sept. 19,
2010).
121. See WILD FARM ALLIANCE, supra note 118. It should be noted that the LGMA
does not officially impose super metrics - usually, the most stringent wildlife-
eliminating standards are imposed by handlers. Nonetheless, the LGMA affirms
these standards by both misapplication of Agreement standards by CDFA auditors
(see supra note 90) and by not imposing a cap on super metric stringency by inde-
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result, farmers are compelled to tear down any potential habitats on
or adjacent to farms, eliminating all natural vegetation and creating
farms which have "carefully plowed, unplanted rows stretching
straight for acres, framed by razed edges and ditches doused with
herbicide."'2 2 Indeed, a survey of 181 growers found that nearly 50%
had been instructed to discourage the presence of wildlife on or
near farms, and that most complied.'2
The effect has been the mass removal of all vegetation, includ-
ing filter strips, hedgerows, grassy waterways, and windbreaks, creat-
ing large and empty buffer zones between farms and wildlife.'" But
most environmental agencies have recommended keeping native
vegetation along farm boundaries, as it reduces erosion and im-
proves water quality by acting as a filter or barrier to farm wastes.
Despite these benefits, the survey indicated that nearly all farmers
nonetheless removed boundary vegetation to deter wild animals. 2 1
The auditing of these GAPs also place organic farmers in a lose-
lose situation. Under the USDA's National Organic Program,'2 par-
ticipants must maintain or improve the natural resources of the op-
eration, including soil, water, wetlands, and wildlife.'"2 Some organic
farmers have faced difficulties when undergoing LGMA audits due
to non-compliance.'"2  Yet, de-certification could spell disaster for
such establishments due to the inability to sell organic crops to han-
dlers.
Some organizations have even attacked the scientific effective-
ness of GAPs and super metrics at improving food safety, claiming
that the vegetation-eliminating practices make contamination more
likely. For instance, vegetation is seen as a filter not only to prevent
the outbound motion of excess farming substances, but also to pre-
pendent handlers. Practically speaking, limiting the buying requirements of han-
dlers is unfeasible due to the proprietary nature of such metrics.
122. See Hopper, supra note 120.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. (noting that hedgerows and filter strips can "catch irrigation runoff and
help filter the water before it re-enters the ecosystem").
126. Id.
127. 7 C.F.R. § 205 (2010). The Program creates a certification program for
growers wishing to call their products "organic." Under the Program, participants
are subjected to various audits and record-keeping requirements.
128. See 7 C.F.R. § 205.200 (2010).
129. See WILD FARM ALLIANCE, supra note 118 ("Several organic farmers told WFA




vent the inbound spread of waterborne pathogens through rain.'o
Others see vegetation as a barrier to pathogenic dust created by cat-
tle areas.'
The fundamental question to be asked is whether there exists a
polar tension between food safety and environmental interests.
LGMA advocates usually contend that the presence of any wild ani-
mals near farms increases the risk of pathogenic transmission.12 In
other words, it is argued that destruction of natural surrounding
habitats is a necessary evil. On the other hand, while some conser-
vationists dispute this claim,' there are distinctly few efforts made
by environmental advocates to reconcile these seemingly opposing
interests. For now, it seems that the relationship between food
safety and conservation is all but a zero-sum game.
B. Does the LGMA Go Far Enough to Compel Compliance of GAPs?
Even assuming that the agricultural standards promulgated by
industry forces are (and will continue to be) independently effective
at improving food safety, a second question to be asked is whether
the LGMA sufficiently ensures that such practices are continuously
enforced or followed?
Two particular characteristics of the Agreement prompt this
question. First, the non-mandatory entry into the LGMA makes it
theoretically possible for producers to either avoid or opt out of the
marketing agreement, removing themselves from the scope of GAP
standards. Thus, there is no guarantee that if consumer concerns
wane, a number of firms will not gradually opt out of the LGMA.
Second, the penalties for non-compliance are far less stringent
than under alternative approaches, such as under Senator Florez's
Plan.'" This not only may provide an insufficient incentive for indi-
vidual firms to comply with GAP guidelines, but also removes any
concrete incentive the CDFA might have in thoroughly performing
130. Id. ("[G]rasses and wetlands have the ability to filter up to 99% of E. coli
during rain events.").
131. Id.
132. See Hopper, supra note 120 (quoting Scott Horsfall, CEO of the LGMA, stat-
ing that "There is a certain amount of scientific evidence that wildlife can be a car-
rier of E. coli..ts]o they are definitely one of the risk factors.").
133. See, e.g., WILD FARM ALLIANCE, supra note 118 (critiquing the inclusion of
deer and rodents as high risk animals).
134. See S.B. 200, 201, supra notes 44 and 46 (authorizing both civil and criminal
penalties for non-compliance).
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its auditing duties. These considerations will be expanded upon in
the following paragraphs.
1. Can Consumer Demand Substitute For Compulsory Regulation?
Throughout early press releases, WGA and other industry asso-
ciations repeatedly represented the LGMA and the array of GAPs
under the plan as "mandatory."' However, there are several dis-
tinctions between the so-called "mandatory" guidelines of the
LGMA and the requirements typically imposed under a primarily
governmental approach. The most glaring is that produce firms are
under no obligation to enter the Agreement. Nor is there an obliga-
tion of already-participating firms to remain within the LGMA. Un-
der a traditional governmental regulatory plan, firms cannot choose
to avoid periodic inspections, nor can they decide to ignore GAP or
HACCP guidelines.'" These two characteristics make it quite clear
that the LGMA's provisions are not as legally "mandatory" as repre-
sented.
Instead of requiring universal GAP compliance by all firms, re-
gardless of entry into a marketing agreement, LGMA relies upon
market forces, such as consumer demand, to compel producers to
enter the program and in turn comply with Agreement GAPs."'
This is perhaps most evident based on the LGMA's specific targeting
of handlers. Because growers must typically sell their crops to han-
dlers (namely, grocers and processors), the Agreement effectively
shifts the pressures of consumer demand onto handlers to purchase
from growers which are in compliance with GAP guidelines. But
recall that retail establishments, such as supermarkets, are exempt
135. See Press Release, Western Growers Association, Western Growers Board
Takes Action to Require Mandatory Food Safety Practices (Oct. 30, 2006), available
at http-://www.wga.com/public/active/siteBuilder/templateNewsReleasePopup.php?
id=70.
136. Senator Florez's proposal included penalties for non-compliance by any
grower. Supra note 64:
113365.8. (a) Any person who negligently or intentionally violates any
state law or regulation, including any quarantine regulation, by importing
any produce or other article, which by virtue of being pest infested or dis-
ease infected, causes an infestation or infection of a pest, animal, or dis-
ease, or causes an existing infestation to spread beyond any quarantine
boundaries..is liable civilly in a sum not to exceed twenty-five thousand
dollars($25,000) for each act that constitutes a violation of the law or regu-
lation.
137. See supra note 73.
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from the definition of "handlers."'" Thus, grocers are unaffected by
the LGMA.
Instead, responding to consumer concerns and the threat of
lost business, many supermarkets and processors have independ-
ently imposed stringent super metrics on their suppliers (i.e. grow-
ers)." Indeed, the institution of such stringent standards does not
appear to be motivated by a scientific effort to improve food safety,
but rather, an effort to allay consumer concerns and maximize
sales.uo Although a marginal amount of growers' costs of compli-
ance with both LGMA GAPs and handler super metrics are reflected
in the price of crops, the relative market power advantages handlers
have over growers typically equates to significantly under-market
prices for large handlers such as supermarket chains,"' thus shifting
the ultimate burden of food safety costs back onto growers.
When consumer concern and demand for the safest products
are at a peak, arrangements such as the LGMA tend to be effective
at compelling the vast majority of handlers and growers to comply
with the terms of the agreement."' The previously cited statistic of
LGMA firms accounting for 90 percent of leafy produce output in
California is strong evidence of this effectiveness."' The question,
though, is whether a possible drop in consumer concern for food
safety will lead to the relaxation of super metrics imposed by han-
138. LGMA, supra note 71, at Article II, Section A(6) ("'Handler' means any per-
son who handles, processes, ships or distributes leafy green product for market
whether as owner, agent, employee, broker or otherwise. This definition does not
include a retailer.").
139. See Hardesty & Kusunose, supra note 104. Although specific super metrics
have been released by some handlers (such as Walmart and Publix), they usually are
considered a trade secret. The general trend is that imposition of super metrics by
handlers is on the rise. Id.
140. Id. (noting that the increasing stringency of super metrics resembles an
"arms race," and usually do not have a strong scientific basis).
141. See, e.g., Hardesty & Kusunose, supra note 104; WILD FARM ALLIANCE, supra
note 118 ("[compliance expenses] will not be passed onto the consumer but will
come out of the [farmer's] net profit.").
142. See, e.g., Brunke et al., supra note 73 (analyzing the use of a collective market-
ing order setting inspection and other quality assurance standards within the Cali-
fornia pistachio industry, and finding that in the wake of food safety crises, "collec-
tive action is likely to be a helpful tool to ensure a safe product and increase bene-
fits to producers and consumers"). This, however, assumes that there is adequate
consumer awareness of the certification process and seal. See Florez, supra note 73
("[M]ost Californians are so accustomed to buying leafy greens without a sticker
they would never know something was missing.").
143. See Cone, supra note 69; Kohnke, supra note 10, at 510.
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dlers, or an exodus of handlers from the LGMA to save the marginal
increases in crop costs from grower compliance.
Simply put, the evidence does not provide a clear answer. On
the one hand, because handlers possess greater market power and
most of the costs of compliance are weathered by growers them-
selves,"' it would appear that handlers have little incentive to reduce
the standards which their suppliers must follow. In addition, recent
historical trends have shown that market power disparity between
processors or grocers and growers has been increasing."' Thus, it
would appear that the LGMA's future membership should remain
steady.
However, other historical trends make this conclusion at least
somewhat questionable. In the pre-2006 era, when consumer con-
cern for produce food safety was relatively low,' 6 the imposition of
such stringent super metrics by grocers and processors was rare."'
Yet, for much of the late 90s and early 2000s, these entities still held
considerable market power advantages over growers."' This would
indicate that there is some correlation between consumer concern
and stringency of super metrics imposed, and less correlation be-
tween market power disparity and the types of metric standards im-
posed by handlers.
Thus, whether or not a possible drop in consumer concern will
lead to less participation in the LGMA is uncertain. But, as I suggest
below, the addition of a "retainer" provision would eliminate any
uncertainty at minimal cost to most participants. With such a modi-
fication, a resolution to the above question is unnecessary.
Another concern is that the voluntary nature of entry into the
LGMA is currently allowing a few growers (the 10 percent of out-
144. See Hardesty & Kusunose, supra note 104, at 11.
145. See, e.g., National Farmers Union, Farm Crisis, EU Subsidies, and Agribusiness
Market Power, AG OBSERVATORY, (Feb. 17, 2000), http://www.agobservatory.org/
library.cfm?filename=farm crisiseu subsidiesand-agribusiness mark.htm ("The
farmers' decreasing share [of profit] is a direct result of processors' and retailers'
increasing market power.").
146. Compare Press Release, Harris Interactive, supra note 21, with Jean C. Buzby
& Richard C. Ready, Do Consumers Trust Food-Safety Information?, FOOD REVIEW,
Jan.-Apr. 1996, at 46, available at http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/foodre-
view/jan1996/fjan96h.pdf.
147. See Steve Gilman, Food Safety Hits the Fan: Regulatory Action, Inaction, and
Over-reaction and the Effects on Small Scale Growers, NORTHEAST ORGANIC FARMING
ASSOCIATION, http://www.nofa.org/policy/leafygreens.php (last visited Sept. 14,
2010) (noting that super metrics generally began to be imposed in response to the
2006 outbreak).
148. See National Farmers Union, supra note 145.
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casts) to avoid any worry of complying with GAPs."' Some attribute
this 10 percent to express exceptions in the LGMA's definition of
"handlers," which exempts restaurants and independent grocers."
There have been reports of some non-compliant growers operating
relatively successful businesses by selling crops to these LGMA-
exempt firms.' Therefore, a handler otherwise operating one of
the exempt establishments allows an outlet for a non-compliant
grower to sell its crops, placing such items in the market for con-
sumption. And while 10 percent of handlers seems insignificant,
recall that a single contaminated leaf may cause a multi-state out-
break.'" For this reason, nearly universal compliance is insufficient.
2. Sufficiency of LGMA Penalties
An even deeper problem with the LGMA is the relatively weak
sanctions imposed upon a finding of non-compliance, creating two
concerns.
The first concern is that the lack of monetary sanctions reduces
any incentive for the CDFA to inspect as thoroughly as it might oth-
erwise. As noted earlier, the maximum penalty for GAP violation is
revocation of a handler's right to represent produce as grown in
compliance with GAPs. The theory is, therefore, that because the
CDFA does not benefit from finding instances of non-compliance,
the agency may not be sufficiently compelled to thoroughly conduct
audits to maximize the number of violations it finds per search. In
other words, the imposition of fines acts as a type of "commission"
for the agency, giving financial incentive for more stringent inspec-
tions.' The lack of fines under the LGMA, therefore, may lead to a
practice of lenient enforcement of GAPs by the CDFA.
149. See Cone, supra note 69; Kohnke, supra note 10, at 510.
150. See Hardesty & Kusunose, supra note 104 (stating that the small number of
non-compliant farms is likely due to the ability to still sell to grocers and restau-
rants).
151. See Tracy Frisch, The Coming Battle Over Food Safety, THE VALLEY TABLE, Dec.
2009 - Feb. 2010, available at http://valleytable.com/article.php?article=002
+Features%2Ffhe+coming+battle+over+food+safety (providing an account of an
organic farmer who stopped dealing with the grocer Wegmans to avoid having to
comply with GAPs. Nonetheless, the farmer still has been able to sell crops directly
to consumers and restaurants and independent grocers which don't impose super
metrics.).
152. See supra note 45.
153. See Gary S. Becker & George J. Stigler, Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and
Compensation of Enforcers, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 16-17 (1974) ("[D]ifferent methods of
improving the quality of enforcement [exist]. One discourages malfeasance by
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It should be noted, however, that based on the percentage of
firms with at least one minor violation, LGMA facility audit reports
do not conclusively indicate a pattern of lax enforcement. In the
2007-08 annual report, approximately 42 percent of facilities in-
spected by the CDFA required corrective action." On the other
hand, the absolute percentage of checkpoint compliance (compli-
ance with individual GAPs) is suspiciously high, at 99.25 percent.'
The lowest category of checkpoint compliance, water use (requiring
periodic self-testing and inspection of irrigation supply), still re-
ported over 98 percent compliance.'" After all, if nearly half of all
facilities had been found in violation of GAPs requiring corrective
action, even an apathetic mind would wonder whether those viola-
tions constituted the tip of the iceberg. What makes these astro-
nomical compliance rates even more suspicious is that the majority
of instances of non- compliance involved procedural deficiencies,
such as insufficient recordkeeping and documentation of soil and
water self-tests. 5
But despite the astronomical reported rates of GAP compli-
ance, contamination of produce has not been eliminated since en-
actment of the Agreement. In 2007, Metz Fresh,'" a member of the
LGMA, issued a massive recall of bagged spinach due to salmonella
contamination."' In addition, Metz Fresh had never been de-
certified or even issued a notice of corrective action by the CDFA."
The continuation of outbreaks provides some evidence that the cur-
rent compliance rate of GAPs is likely not as high as is represented.
And although there is essentially no way to verify the accuracy of the
raising the salaries of public enforcers, whereas the other encourages results by
paying enforcers for performance, or on a piece-rate basis.").
154. ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 78, at 5.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 6-7.
158. Metz Fresh LLC, headquartered in King City, CA (in the heart of the Salinas
Valley), is one of the largest spinach producers in the world. Cary Blake, Food Safety
Produce Leaders Want Level Playing Field Nationwide, WESTERN FARM PRESS (Dec. 15,
2007, 12:00 AM), http://westernfarmpress.com/mag/farming-food-safety-produce/.
159. Center for Infectious Disease Research and Policy, Spinach Recall Renews
Debate Over Produce Safety, CENTER FOR INFECTIOUS DISEASE RES. & POL'Y (Aug. 31,
2007), http://www.cidrap.umn.edu/cidrap/content/fs/food-disease/news/aug3l07
spinach-jw.html. Metz Fresh recalled over 8,000 cartons of bagged spinach. Com-
pany representatives stated, however, that most of the recalled spinach never
reached consumers. Id.




CDFA's numbers, incentivizing more stringent auditing practices by
the CDFA may nonetheless help eliminate prospective concerns of
lax enforcement.
A secondary concern is that even if de-certification is seen as a
significant penalty for growers and handlers which buy from non-
compliant growers, the LGMA allows for a number of occurrences
of non-compliance before any de-certification action is imposed. As
discussed earlier, only "repeated or flagrant violations" (i.e. viola-
tions posing a significant risk to food safety) result in de-
certification."' But to constitute a "repeated" violation, a grower
must commit multiple "major deviations" (violations "inhibiting the
maintenance of food safety but not necessarily resulting in unsafe
product").' Further, it takes multiple "minor infractions" (practices
not necessarily increasing the risk of foodborne illness) to equal a
single "minor deviation."' In other words, growers are given sub-
stantial leeway before the threat of de-certification looms - working
up the chain of violations, it takes dozens of minor infractions to
constitute a single flagrant violation. Even when de-certification
occurs, it is usually limited to two weeks - a relatively marginal pe-
riod of time.'
In short, the schedule of penalties is so forgiving under the
LGMA that only the most blatant patterns of non-compliance are
sanctioned, allowing less blatant violations that still may adversely
affect food safety.
C. Redeeming Qualities of the LGMA
While the above discussion points to a number of potential and
current flaws of the LGMA, in reality, the LGMA advances perhaps
the two most important virtues of a regulatory program - low state
161. See ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 78, at 6.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 6. In 2007-08, the CDFA found five flagrant violations. The only sanc-
tion imposed was temporary decertification for two weeks. Each of the decertified
firms was recertified after the violations were corrected. Of 45 less severe "major
deviations" found, 37 were due to recordkeeping deficiencies. However, accumula-
tion of three major deviations constitutes a single flagrant violation. Further, mul-
tiple "minor deviations" (practices which did not necessarily increase the risk of
foodborne illness) within one year constitutes a major deviation. Finally, multiple
"minor infractions" within a year constitutes a minor deviation. Theoretically,
therefore, a firm could be sanctioned with a minor deviation during each inspec-
tion throughout the year, and, at worst, lose certification for two weeks. Id.
164. Id. at 6-7.
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costs and expediency. These redeeming qualities provide strong
support for retaining, in some form, marketing agreements such as
the LGMA as a tool for the improvement of food safety.
1. Industry's Assumption of Enforcement Costs
Even if the CDFA's auditing process may not be particularly
thorough in practice, it is noteworthy that the entire auditing proc-
ess costs the state essentially nothing. The LGMA assesses per-
carton fees on its participants,"' and approximately half of these
funds are funneled to the CDFA for inspection duties. In other
words, the collective fee paid by handlers operates as an investment
of sorts - handlers voluntarily fund governmental oversight pro-
grams with the expectation that such oversight will reap future
benefits primarily in the form of increased consumer demand (and,
in turn, greater revenue). Such a setup is immensely important for
states such as California, which have sustained massive budgetary
deficits in recent years." The setup of the LGMA is thus laudable in
that it pays governmental institutions for mobilizing demand, creat-
ing a win-win situation for both the state and industry, with minimal
public expenditures.
2. Time and Flexibility Advantages
In an area such as food safety, where an outbreak can occur
without warning, the ability to change standards quickly in response
to external forces is important.m However, under traditional agency
165. See LGMA, supra note 71, at Article IX, Section B ("Assessment shall not
exceed five cents per carton along with annual assessment.").
166. See, e.g., Kristin Kloberdanz, The Great California Fiscal Earthquake, TIME
MAGAZINE (Jan. 8, 2009), http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,
1870299,00.html.
167. See Stearns, supra note 87, at 391-392 (describing the regulatory response
after the 1993 Jack in the Box E. coli outbreak in 1993, discussed at supra note 4, as
"prompt and significant," including a unilateral declaration by the USDA that E.
coli 0157:H7 constituted an adulterant under the Federal Meat Inspection Act, as
opposed to rulemaking); Joseph A. Levitt, CFSAN's Program Priorities: From Food
Safety to Food Security, 58 FooD & DRUG L.J. 19, 21 (2003) ("Despite our best efforts,
we cannot expect to prevent every foodborne illness outbreak. We should expect,
however, that when an outbreak does occur, federal, state, and local authorities
work together to identify the problem, perform traceback investigations, and re-
move the product or products from the market as quickly as possible.. Indeed,
faster outbreak response is one of the most substantial improvements in the food
safety system over the past five years.").
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operations, procedural constraints, including notice and comment
periods and consideration requirements, slow down the process of
rule promulgation.'" Under the LGMA, new rules may be formed
on the basis of a vote and a signature." Assuming an equally-
composed Board and a well-informed Secretary, the LGMA's setup
is ideal within the food safety context, as it allows for the rapid crea-
tion of rules in times of crisis while harnessing the in-house industry
experience of LGMA and CDFA actors. In other words, the setup,
operating under these structural assumptions, avoids the typical
"stickiness" of the agency rulemaking process, minimizing the time
necessary to advance industry standards.
VI. ADJUSTING THE LGMA TO HARNESS THE ADVANTAGES OF
MARKETING AGREEMENTS AND BETTER ENSURE FOOD SAFETY
Because of the importance of these strengths, full-fledged de-
struction of the LGMA is neither necessary nor desirable. Instead,
the following discussion intends to establish that the deficiencies
described above can be addressed by relatively marginal structural
changes in the LGMA, while still retaining the benefits of low public
costs and efficient standard promulgation.
168. See Kohnke, supra note 10, at 515 (detailing the LGMA-sponsor Western
Growers' argument that "unlike an inflexible piece of legislation, the quality of the
GAPs could be constantly improved upon under an industry-driven approach..it
can reflect the latest science, the latest data and the latest trends... A law is very
difficult to change."); Stearns, supra note 87, at 392-394 (characterizing the FSIS'
prompt declaration of E. coli as an adulterant, as opposed to following traditional
rulemaking procedures as unexpected, and subsequently challenged by the meat
industry on the ground that the declaration was "not promulgated through appro-
priate rulemaking procedures"); M. Elizabeth Magill, Congressional Control Over
Agency Rulemaking: The Nutrition Labeling and Education Act's Hammer Provisions, 50
FOOD & DRUG L.J. 149, 156 (1995) (stating that within the context of promulgating
labeling standards under the NLEA, "regulatory delay is a source of great frustra-
tion for Congress..Such delay is in part attributable to the increasing burdens
placed on agency rulemaking (some of them by Congress), the sheer number of
tasks assigned to agencies in statutes, and the enormous complexity entailed in
contemporary rulemaking.").
169. LGMA, supra note 71, Article III, Section F(2) and Article III, Section D(2)
("To recommend to the Department rules and regulations relating to [the LGMA].")
(emphasis added).
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A. Correcting the Lack of Meaningful Agency Review
and Practicability Concerns
As discussed in part IV, the numerical and financial domination
of the LGAB by industry actors enables the body to create rules
pending only Secretary approval. Because of this domination, the
lone agency voice on the Board may be insufficient to call for notice
and comment periods or other information-gathering techniques
when necessary to make a reasoned decision. While this inability
gives rise to the virtue of expediency, it still may preclude the possi-
bility of data gathering even when time is not of the essence.
Adding composition requirements of the Board into the terms
of the LGMA would help eliminate this potential. For instance, re-
quiring an increased presence of public Board members (i.e. those
representing public agencies) may allow agency voices to effectively
call for more information-gathering sessions when the agency is un-
der-informed on a particular proposed rule. The arrangement
would help improve the ability of the CDFA to meaningfully assess
the merits of the Board's proposals. At the same time, it would
avoid the cumbersome procedural constraints typically imposed on
agencies, as it can gather data only when it is deemed necessary.
A related concern articulated earlier is that under the LGMA,
the rulemaking Board could be dominated by representatives from
large firms, which may not be concerned with the economic con-
straints or the ability of small firms to comply with GAP guidelines.
Further, the possibility of such one-sided composition could lead to
predatory practices to drive smaller firms out of business.
Again, the corrective measure here is simple addition of Board
composition constraints. In addition to increasing the number of
public members, requiring reasonably representative Board mem-
bership based on firm size would help put small firm concerns on
the map. A possible Board arrangement would continue the ap-
pointment power of the CDFA secretary, but require at least one
seat to be allocated to a representative of a small firm. This would
provide at least some representation to smaller firms to express
their concerns with newly-proposed rules. And because of the in-
creased role of the agency within the Board, a lone voice may be
enough to precipitate further deliberation.
While the effectiveness of these proposals has yet to be ob-
served within the specific context of the LGMA, structural changes
to similar rulemaking boards in other areas have produced mean-
ingful results. For instance, the National Labor Relations Board, an
authoritative rulemaking body charged with the investigation and
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combat of unfair labor practices, is composed of members ap-
pointed by the President. In the 1950s and 60s, the general practice
of appointing members was to further the diversity of the board to
create a balanced mix of business, labor, and state members.'" Un-
der this setup, compromise between labor and business flourished,
as both productivity and wages increased."' However, the Board-
appointment practice changed in the 1980s, and appointed mem-
bers were most often associated with big business."' This change in
Board composition lead to continued weak growth in worker pro-
ductivity and significant decreases in the compensation of high
school graduates."' The example of the NLRB and its historical ap-
pointment practices thus provides some indication that regulations
altering the standards for board appointment can affect the progress
of the entire program.
B. Preventing Regression in LGMA Participation
The addition of a penalty clause under the LGMA could ensure
that in the event of waning consumer concern for food safety, indi-
vidual firms will continue to participate in the Agreement and abide
by GAP guidelines. As the LGMA is a contractual agreement be-
tween handlers, the CDFA, and the LGAB, the addition of a penalty
clause, imposing a monetary schedule of forfeitures, may discourage
the occurrence of LGMA dropouts. For instance, by adding a clause
requiring participation in the contract for a set number of years,
fees for the Agreement may be collected up front. If a firm defects,
it automatically forfeits any amount paid towards the Agreement. In
addition, extra fees could be assessed on such firms. Imposing
monetary penalties may help discourage a decline in LGMA partici-
pation.
On the other hand, expanding consumer knowledge of the sig-
nificance of LGMA participation presents an alternative and market-
based approach to intrinsically enticing firms to remain in the
LGMA. Since the LGMA's focus on handlers affirms that the pro-
gram relies heavily on market forces such as consumer demand to
170. See Frank Levy & Peter Temin, Inequality and Institutions in 20th Century
America 20 (MIT INDUST. PERFORMANCE CTR., Working Paper No. 07-002, 2007)
(noting that under the Truman administration, appointment of NLRB Board mem-
bers was diverse and equally balanced between business and labor representatives).
171. Id. at 33.
172. Id. at 39.
173. Id.
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spur participation, expanding consumer awareness enhances the
market-based deterrent effect of LGMA regression. A statewide
public awareness campaign has begun, but is still largely limited to
only internet media channels. Expanding the campaign to a more
mainstream television campaign might help in improving consumer
awareness, strengthening the incentive for firms to remain in the
LGMA in the long-term.
C. Enhancing Enforcement
As the LGMA represents the public enforcement of largely pri-
vately created rules, the CDFA is not engaged in the enforcement of
self-created rules. Because of this disconnect, it is important to pro-
vide incentives for the agency to vigorously enforce promulgated
rules by allowing the agency to impose fines on non-compliant
firms. Implementing a schedule of monetary penalties creates two
basic effects. First, it may encourage firms to make greater efforts
to assure compliance, in order to avoid the financial losses incurred
from penalty."' Second, it may encourage CDFA auditors to con-
duct more stringent inspections, as the agency gains from finding
more instances of non-compliance.
VII. CONCLUSION
Created in response to one of the largest food illness outbreaks
in recent history, the LGMA represents a novel effort to allocate
regulatory responsibility among industry and state. Indeed, the ap-
proach effectively harnesses the virtues of low public costs and effi-
cient regulation creation on the fly. However, these positives may
not be fully realized due to structural deficiencies in the terms of the
Agreement. The diminished role of the state agency, increasing the
chances of future promulgation of administratively arbitrary regula-
tions and impracticable standards for smaller growers, inhibits the
incorporation of evolving food safety principles into growing prac-
tices. Left unchecked, the numerical domination of the board by
large firms, without the presence of offsetting agency or small firm
voices, creates the propensity for rampant market abuse, incentivizes
174. See JEAN M. RAWSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., IB10037: MEAT AND POULTRY
INSPECTION ISSUES (2000), available at http://www.ncseonline.org/NLE/CRSre-
ports/Agriculture/ag-30.cfm (noting that the USDA recognized that the ability to
impose civil fines would serve as an "effective deterrent" for violations).
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a predatory rulemaking process, and may lead to the disposal of
environmental concerns in growing processes.
While it is unclear whether the voluntary nature of entry into
the Agreement has effectively harnessed consumer demand in com-
pelling universal membership, the lack of a "retainer" provision,
binding signatory handlers to the terms of the Agreement for a
minimum time period, allows for the gradual waning of membership
when consumer concern for produce safety declines, as has been
observed in the previously voluntary regulatory framework for leafy
produce. Finally, the Agreement's failure to impose sufficiently de-
terrent penalties further minimizes the LGMA's ability to induce
substantive changes in growing practices, while simultaneously re-
moving incentives for governmental agencies to conduct stringent
audits.
But while the consequences of these deficiencies are substantial,
they are neither creating obvious dilemmas today, nor are they par-
ticularly difficult to correct. With the appropriate modification of
the LGMA's terms, the current budgetary crises many states are fac-
ing make national implementation of such a program both a viable
and advantageous solution. A simple modification of the Agree-
ment's terms to enhance the representativeness and governmental
oversight of the Board, and to create a schedule of penalties for
noncompliance, will help ensure that the LGMA reflects a new, co-
operative effort at improving food safety - rather than a mere vari-
ant of the unsuccessful pre-outbreak framework.
2010] 309

